Optimal Lobbying Behavior and Government Response: Implications for Agriculture

Marcel Fafchamps, Elisabeth Sadoulet () and Alain de Janvry ()

No 271168, 1991 Annual Meeting, August 4-7, Manhattan, Kansas from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: A general equilibrium model with optimal lobbying behavior and endogenous government behavior is solved numerically. It predicts that sectors which are more flexible, larger, and produce commodities with lower income elasticities and higher budget shares tend to be disprotected, explaining the price bias against agriculture in developing countries. Optimal

Keywords: Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15
Date: 1991-08-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea91:271168

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.271168

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