THE ECONOMICS OF DECOUPLED PAYMENTS IN THE PRESENCE OF CHEATING

Konstantinos Giannakas () and Murray E. Fulton

No 20849, 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: This paper introduces enforcement costs and farmer misrepresentation into the economic analysis of decoupled area payments. When enforcement is costly, complete deterrence of cheating is never optimal from an economic perspective. Misrepresentation changes the welfare effects of the policy instrument, its transfer efficiency, and the socially optimal income redistribution.

Keywords: Institutional; and; Behavioral; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea98:20849

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20849

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