AGRICULTURAL BANK EFFICIENCY AND THE ROLE OF MANAGERIAL RISK PREFERENCES

Bernard Kaku Ndarku Armah and Timothy Park

No 20909, 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: We investigate the objectives of agricultural bank managers and their impacts on bank efficiency. If managers are non-neutral toward risk, then banks may appear inefficient when they are not. We find non-neutrality toward risk and efficiency gains due to firm size, loan shares, asset shares, and share of market deposits.

Keywords: Financial Economics; Risk and Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea98:20909

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20909

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