TESTING FOR COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF LAND TENURE CONTRACTS IN TEXAS

Siddhartha Dasgupta, H. Love, Thomas O. Knight and Stephen Devadoss

No 20917, 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: Share contracts under information asymmetry often involve input application and risk sharing inefficiency. These difficulties are nullified under full information which can be approximated in repeated contracts. We give evidence of cooperation in repeated contracts, indicating the existence of full information efficiency and efficient resource use, despite underlying information asymmetry.

Keywords: Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Land Economics/Use (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea98:20917

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20917

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