TAXATION, FINES, AND PRODUCER LIABILITY RULES: EFFICIENCY AND MARKET STRUCTURE IMPLICATIONS

Stephen Hamilton

No 20928, 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: This paper addresses the comparative efficiency of liability rules and regulatory policy in competitive equilibria with endogenous product safety. Pigouvian taxation fails to achieve long-run social optimality. A policy involving accident fines and safety subsidization can achieve efficiency, although the optimal policy may involve taxation, not subsidization, of product safety.

Keywords: Public; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14
Date: 1998
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20928/files/sphami01.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Taxation, Fines, and Producer Liability Rules: Efficiency and Market Structure Implications (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea98:20928

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20928

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().