UNDERSTANDING PRODUCTION CONTRACTS: TESTING AN AGENCY THEORY MODEL

Rachael Goodhue, Gordon Rausser and Leo Simon

No 20946, 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: Production contracts are increasingly important in American agriculture. Unfortunately, little is known about the fundamental forces governing their adoption and design. In order to better-understand the underlying incentives, we construct and test an agency-theoretic model of broiler production contracts. We discuss the analysis' implications for industry participants and government policy.

Keywords: Industrial Organization; Livestock Production/Industries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea98:20946

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20946

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