QUALITY MEASUREMENT AND RISK-SHARING IN CONTRACTS FOR CALIFORNIA FRUITS AND VEGETABLES

Brent Hueth () and Ethan Ligon

No 20957, 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: We hypothesize that imperfect quality measurement in contracts for fresh fruits and vegetables results in a moral-hazard problem, and that the final price of the produce provides additional information regarding quality. As a consequence, growers are not shielded from all price risk. This hypothesis is tested informally with observations on actual contracts in California.

Keywords: Demand and Price Analysis; Risk and Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea98:20957

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20957

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