ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND EXECUTIVE-EMPLOYEE RISK SHARING

Peter Goldsmith () and Rishi Basak ()

No 21546, 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: A principal-agent approach is used to address issues of environmental risk sharing within a firm. The principal (top management), fearing penalties for environmental damages, wants to avoid environmental harm and induce the agent (employee manipulating hazardous materials) to take appropriate actions to achieve due diligence.

Keywords: Agribusiness; Environmental Economics and Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea99:21546

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.21546

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