OPTIMAL AGRICULTURAL LAND PRICING POLICIES UNDER MULTIPLE EXTERNALITIES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY
Jeffrey Peterson ()
No 21613, 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)
Agriculture has recently been noted as a provider of non-market environmental benefits in addition to its traditional recognition as a source of negative externalities from polluting inputs. In this paper, a general equilibrium framework is used to determine optimal land subsidies and input taxes in agriculture. When agriculture generates both amenities and pollution, the optimal subsidy does not equal the net extra-market value of agricultural land. If opened to international trade, a small economy will fully correct externalities, while large economies have an incentive to set policies at non-internalizing levels to exploit terms-of-trade effects.
Keywords: Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea99:21613
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().