OPTIMAL COMPENSATION FOR ENDANGERED SPECIES PROTECTION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

Anne-Juliane Huennemeyer, Ross McKitrick and Kimberly Rollins

No 21693, 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: This paper argues that policies based on economic instruments are preferable to command and control approaches for effectively protecting biological diversity. This is due to sources of inefficiencies because of informational asymmetries between the regulator and private land users. We propose a principal agent framework to design optimally structured and performance based economic incentives for private land owners.

Keywords: Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource/Energy Economics and Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea99:21693

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.21693

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