The Allocation of Property Rights when One Action Produces a Public and a Private Good

Loris Strappazzon, Arthur Ha, Mark Eigenraam, Charlotte Duke and Gary Stoneham

No 174045, 2002 Conference (46th), February 13-15, 2002, Canberra, Australia from Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society

Abstract: In this paper we analyse the efficiency impacts of different property right allocations when one action produces a private and a public good. There are three players: an environmental agency, point-source emitters and diffuse emitters. We assume a diffuse emitter can undertake one action that produces two outputs: one he can sell to the environmental agency (a public good); and the other he can sell to point-source emitters (a private good). We analyse the efficiency implications of allocating the property right of the private good to either: (i) the agency, since in buying the public good the private good is produced as a by-product; or (ii) the diffuse emitter. Generally, the latter improves the efficiency outcome.

Keywords: Community/Rural/Urban Development; Land Economics/Use; Public Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34
Date: 2002-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aare02:174045

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.174045

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