Can a simple model predict complex bidding behaviour? Repeated multi-unit conservation auctions

Steven Schilizzi and Uwe Latacz-Lohmann

No 137947, 2005 Conference (49th), February 9-11, 2005, Coff's Harbour, Australia from Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society

Abstract: Buying environmental services from private landholders using auction mechanisms often involves repeated multi-unit procurement-type auctions. These can either be target-constrained or budget-constrained. Most of the theoretical literature has focused on the former, whereas government agencies have, for conservation purposes, mainly implemented the latter. This paper examines the predictive power of a simple model previously developed for budget-constrained auctions, in comparison to that of the more standard and more complex target-constrained auction model. Experiments carried out in Germany and Australia lend credibility to the nonstandard and simpler budget-constrained model.

Keywords: Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/Statistical Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aare05:137947

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.137947

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