When should biodiversity tenders contract on outcomes?

Russell Gorddard (), Stuart Whitten () and Andrew Reeson

No 5979, 2008 Conference (52nd), February 5-8, 2008, Canberra, Australia from Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society

Abstract: Making conservation program payments conditional on outcomes offers potential efficiency and innovation improvements over input based contracts. This paper explores the trade-offs involved in choosing the payment criteria for biodiversity tenders. A model where the budget for a conservation tender can be allocated to input, outcome or mixed payments is used to explore the impacts of hidden actions, adverse selection, and landholder risk aversion on the optimal policy design. We discuss the implications of these results for the design of the ‘Nest Egg’ tender. This tender is targeting habitat and breeding of ground-nesting birds in the New South Wales Murray Catchment.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-env
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/5979/files/cp08go02.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aare08:5979

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.5979

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2008 Conference (52nd), February 5-8, 2008, Canberra, Australia from Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().