EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Some Distributional Issues in Greenhouse Gas Policy Design

John Freebairn

No 6770, 2008 Conference (52nd), February 5-8, 2008, Canberra, Australia from Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society

Abstract: The paper argues from first principles and with supporting related empirical evidence that most of the final incidence of emissions taxes or tradable permits will fall on consumers of greenhouse gas intensive products. This distributional outcome supports an emissions reduction strategy of an emissions tax or auctioning the tradable permits, rather than gifting permits in a grandfather arrangement to current polluters as was done in Europe and has currency with proposals for Australia. Greenhouse gas emissions and climate change is a global pollution problem that gives rise to a prisoner’s dilemma problem in which the global cooperative solution in undermined by individual countries free-riding. Some of the issues and challenges to be overcome to reach a cooperative global policy package are discussed, including the different interests and perspectives of developed and developing countries.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6770/files/cp08fr02.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aare08:6770

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.6770

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2008 Conference (52nd), February 5-8, 2008, Canberra, Australia from Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:ags:aare08:6770