Favoritism and allocative efficiency: a game theoretic approach

Moe Farida and Fredoun Z. Ahmadi-Esfahani

No 48156, 2009 Conference (53rd), February 11-13, 2009, Cairns, Australia from Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society

Abstract: This paper seeks to investigate the interaction between favoritism and allocative efficiency. The issue of whether corruption distorts allocative efficiency in a bribery game under a pre-existing environment of alleged favoritism is considered. It is demonstrated that if there is no unambiguous favoritism, observed favoritism in bribery game may disrupt allocative efficiency. A bribery game under corruption and favoritism is developed. The model and some possible equilibria are discussed. A simple numerical example from Lebanon is also presented.

Pages: 21
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aare09:48156

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.48156

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