Farsighted Fuzzy Coalitions in an Economy with Multilateral Negative Externalities

Nahim Bin Zahur

No 165807, 2014 Conference (58th), February 4-7, 2014, Port Macquarie, Australia from Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society

Abstract: How do coalitions form in games with externalities? This is important for understanding whether full cooperation be sustained in tackling problems such as climate change. In traditional coalition formation games, each player makes a binary decision on whether or not to cooperate. But what if players within coalitions choose not to cooperate fully with each other? This study looks at the coalition formation process

Keywords: Resource/Energy; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 1
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-env and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/165807/files/Bin%20Zahur%20Poster.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aare14:165807

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.165807

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2014 Conference (58th), February 4-7, 2014, Port Macquarie, Australia from Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().