On The Coexistence of Share, Rent and Wage Contracts In a Rural Economy

Parikshit Ghosh

No 315943, Institute for Economic Development from Boston University

Abstract: This paper attempts to explain the observed diversity of agricultural contracts within close-knit geographical regions, often within the same village. The explanation rests on two main assumptions: heterogeneity in land quality, with landlords being better informed about the quality of their own plots than prospective tenants, and moral hazard problems associated with hired labor. In the process, we also derive a sharp testable relationship between land quality and contractual form-it is predicted that best quality land will be cultivated by the owner, medium grade land will be sharecropped, and poorest quality land will be rented out on a fixed rent basis. A look at some available data largely supports this last prediction.

Keywords: Labor; and; Human; Capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 1995
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/315943/files/IED58.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:bouied:315943

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.315943

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Institute for Economic Development from Boston University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().