The Underlining Game

Alan Woodfield

No 263801, Department of Economics Discussion Papers from University of Canterbury - New Zealand

Abstract: Academic institutions may go beyond observing lexicographic ordering of authors in attempting to determine relative contributions to joint research. The present article examines incentive issues arising when applicants for promotion are requested to underline the name of any principal author(s). This mechanism is not generally incentive compatible. Recognizing the generally sequential nature of contribution reporting, a scheme which induces global truthful revelation is developed Punishment is imposed on prior movers making claims of authorship seniority which are contradicted by subsequent movers. Where applications are simultaneous, contradicted claims of seniority lead to group punishment in that no author is promoted.

Keywords: Agricultural; and; Food; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:canzdp:263801

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.263801

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