EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Increasing Protection of GIS at the WTO: Clawbacks, Greenfields and Monopoly Rents

May Yeung and William Kerr

No 43459, Working Papers from Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy Research Network

Abstract: Currently there are proposals and negotiations regarding the strengthening of protection for geographic indicators (GIs) in the WTO. A major proponent of stronger protection for GIs has been the European Union. One of the arguments it has put forward for stronger protection has been that it will provide an avenue for economic development for agricultural producers in developing countries – a way to capture rents in the markets of developed countries. This paper first outlines the proposed changes to the international protection of geographic indicators. Second, the potential for groups of producers to generate and capture rents in foreign markets is assessed under differing assumptions pertaining to industry structure, product differentiation in the short and long run, barriers to entry reputation and the form of legal protection in importing countries. A discussion of the resource requirements to establish and maintain a GI is also provided.

Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy; International Development; International Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 2008-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/43459/files/CA ... WP2008-02%20Kerr.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:catpwp:43459

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.43459

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy Research Network Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:ags:catpwp:43459