Are Agricultural PACs Monolithic? An Empirical Investigation
Craig A. Bond,
Dana Hoag (),
Jennifer Freeborn and
Terry Van Doren
No 108718, Working Papers from Colorado State University, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics
This paper analyzes donation strategies of agricultural PACs by examining and testing a variety of variables theoretically related to contributions and formally testing for equivalence of donation strategies across PACs of varying levels of aggregation. Both chambers of the 108th Congress were modeled, with particular attention paid to the targeting of different power or influence sources within the legislature. Results showed significant heterogeneity across PAC subaggregates within a chamber, as well as between chambers, in terms of overall strategy and magnitude of marginal impacts. Evidence supporting the conditional party government hypothesis where PACs target top Party officials rather than influential legislative members was mixed and subindustry specific, with chairmanships apparently less important in the Senate than in the House.
Keywords: Agricultural; and; Food; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:csdawp:108718
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