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Does Conditionality Generate Heterogeneity and Regressivity in Program Impacts? The Progresa Experience

Juan Chavez-Martin del Campo (jcchavezm@banxico.org.mx)

No 127042, Working Papers from Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management

Abstract: We study both empirically and theoretically the consequences of introducing a conditional cash transfer scheme for the distribution of program impacts. Intuitively, if the conditioned-on good is normal, then better-offhouseholds tend to receive a larger positive impact. I formalize this insight by means of a simple model of child labor, applying the Nash-Bargaining approach as the solution concept. A series of tests for heterogeneity in program impacts are developed and applied to Progresa, an anti-poverty program in Mexico. It can be concluded that this program exhibits a lot of heterogeneity in treatment effects. Consistent with the model, and under the assumption of rank preservation, program impacts are distributionally regressive, although positive, within the treated population

Keywords: Research; Methods/Statistical; Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:cudawp:127042

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.127042

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