Exploring Voting Anomalies Using a Demand Revealing Random Price Voting Mechanism

Kent Messer (), Gregory Poe, Daniel Rondeau, William D. Schulze and Christian Vossler

No 127062, Working Papers from Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management

Abstract: Recent papers show that in group decisions individuals have social preferences for efficiency and equity. However, the effect of social preferences on voting, the predominant funding mechanism for public goods, has not been thoroughly examined. This study investigates whether voting decisions are affected by the distribution of net benefits associated with a proposed public program using a new Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM). Theoretical and econometric analysis of experimental results presented in the paper suggest that observed differences from selfish voting are caused by a concern for social efficiency, and that voting may be more efficient than previously thought.

Keywords: Demand; and; Price; Analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:cudawp:127062

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.127062

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