Designing Nonpoint Source Policies With Limited Information About Both Risk Attitudes and Production Technology

Jeffrey Peterson and Richard N. Boisvert

No 127661, Working Papers from Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management

Abstract: A pollution reduction program is designed where information about both techno logy and risk preferences is asymmetric. Program costs and the distribution of payments depend on the amount of information known to the policy maker. Empirically testable conditions for selfselection are derived; the method is applied to reducing nitrate contamination.

Keywords: Risk; and; Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45
Date: 2001-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:cudawp:127661

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.127661

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