Securite Sanitaire Des Aliments: Fausse Alerte Et Vraie Crise

Eric Cahuzac, Daniel Hassan and Sylvette Monier-Dilhan

No 9439, 103rd Seminar, April 23-25, 2007, Barcelona, Spain from European Association of Agricultural Economists

Abstract: These last years, a fall in consumer's confidence in food safety encouraged false alerts which sometimes led to actual crisis. This paper studies a crisis due to an alert concerning a risk of listeria on a raw milk camembert brand. The investigation relies on individual data. Two results of risk economy are confirmed. Firstly, information has asymmetric effects, according its positive or negative aspects. Secondly, punctual alerts have only temporary effects on consumption. In this crisis, education and consumer's habits did not pay any role.

Keywords: Food; Consumption/Nutrition/Food; Safety (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Sécurité sanitaire des aliments: fausse alerte et vraie crise (2007)
Journal Article: Sécurité sanitaire des aliments: fausse alerte et vraie crise (2007)
Working Paper: Sécurité sanitaire des aliments: fausse alerte et vraie crise (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:eaa103:9439

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.9439

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