Governance and Surplus Distribution in Commodity Value Chains in Africa
Anneleen Vandeplas and
No 7950, 106th Seminar, October 25-27, 2007, Montpellier, France from European Association of Agricultural Economists
The governance of food markets is a crucial element for efficiency and distributional effects. In this paper, we use a conceptual model to show that this governance itself is endogenous in an environment of weak contract enforcement and imperfect markets, and importantly depends on the value in the chain. We relate the predictions of the theory to empirical evidence on differences in supply chain governance in Africa across different commodity types. In doing so we offer an explanation as why private sector governance systems with interlinked market transactions have emerged for higher value crops but not for staple food crops. We discuss the efficiency and equity effects and the implications for policy.
Keywords: Agribusiness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:eaa106:7950
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