An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Plant Variety Protection Legislation on Innovation and Transferability

Chittur Srinivasan, Bhavani Shankar and Garth Holloway ()

No 24788, 2002 International Congress, August 28-31, 2002, Zaragoza, Spain from European Association of Agricultural Economists

Abstract: Under the TRIPs Agreement, all member-countries of the World Trade Organization are required to provide an "effective" system of plant variety protection within a specific time frame. In many developing countries this has led to a divisive debate about the fundamental desirability of extending intellectual property rights to agriculture. But empirical studies on the economic impacts of PVP, especially its ability to generate large private sector investments in plant breeding and facilitate the transfer of technology, have been very limited. This paper examines two aspects of the international experience of PVP legislation thus far (i) The relationship between legislation, R&D expenditures and PVP grants, i.e., the innovation effect, and (ii) The role of PVP in facilitating the flow of varieties across countries, i.e., the transferability effect.

Keywords: Crop; Production/Industries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:eaae02:24788

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.24788

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