Competing Screening Rules

George W.J. Hendrikse and Yamei Hu

No 24522, 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark from European Association of Agricultural Economists

Abstract: Various studies show that agricultural cooperatives behave differently than their investor-owned counterparts. One explanation may be that the internal decision making process differs in these two governance structures. A model is developed to explore how endogenous screening rules affect efficient organizational choices and industrial structures. It is shown that screening level choice may outweigh architecture choice and that screening rules are strategic substitutes. Conditions are derived under which cooperatives are efficient organizational forms. It is also shown that competition may increase the attractiveness of investor-owned firms and circumstances are determined in which cooperatives and investor owned firms coexist in equilibrium.

Keywords: Agribusiness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20
Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/24522/files/cp05he04.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:eaae05:24522

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.24522

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark from European Association of Agricultural Economists Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().