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Using Evolutionary Game Theory to Examine U.S. and EU Agricultural Policy Institutions

David Bullock () and Klaus Mittenzwei

No 24538, 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark from European Association of Agricultural Economists

Abstract: A brief review of the history of agricultural policymaking in Europe and the U.S. reveals that major policy changes have often been brought about by major socio-political "shocks," such as the Great Depression and World War II. Such shocks also lead to the creation of institutions that tend to stay in place for long periods after the initial shock has passed. We use evolutionary game theory to model and simulate the effects of socio-political shocks on political institutions.

Keywords: Agricultural; and; Food; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:eaae05:24538

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.24538

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