Dynamics of Phosphorus Fertilization and Liming Under Land Tenure Insecurity

Sami Myyrä and Kyosti Pietola

No 24633, 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark from European Association of Agricultural Economists

Abstract: This article solves and characterizes optimal decision rules to invest in irreversible land improvements conditional on land tenure insecurity. Economic model is a normative dynamic programming model with known parameter for the one period returns and transition equations. The decision rules are solved numerically conditional on alternative scenarios on the likelihood that the lease contract and, thus, farmer access to land is either renewed or expires. The model parameters represent Finnish soil quality and production conditions. The results suggest that irreversible land improvements decrease quickly and the yields decline gradually when the farmer is confronted with land tenure insecurity caused by uncertain renewal of the lease contract.

Keywords: Land; Economics/Use (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/24633/files/cp05my01.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:eaae05:24633

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.24633

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark from European Association of Agricultural Economists Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().