 EFFECTIVENESS OF CROSS-COMPLIANCE UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND DIFFERENTIATED COMPLIANCE CONSTRAINTSMeri Raggi, Fabio Bartolini (), Vittorio Gallerani and Davide Viaggi No 44151, 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium from European Association of Agricultural Economists Abstract: The effects of cross-compliance depend on the strategies of participation/compliance of farmers, as well as on the ability of public administration to design appropriate policy mechanisms. The objective of this paper is to present a framework for the analysis of cross-compliance under asymmetric information with the option of differentiating commitments across farmers. The methodology is applied to a case study represented by the province of Bologna (Italy). The results show that, in the present conditions of control and sanctions, only a small share of farms is interested in complying with cross-compliance. The profitability of the choice of compliance/non-compliance depends mainly on the amount of single farm payment entitlements compared with the total land. The differentiation of restrictions across farmers, under relevant budget constraints for controls, appears a key strategic components in order to ensure the effectiveness of cross-compliance. Keywords: Farm; Management (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:eaae08:44151 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium from European Association of Agricultural Economists Contact information at EDIRC. |
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