Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Safety Standard
Elodie Rouviere () and
Raphael Soubeyran ()
No 44465, 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium from European Association of Agricultural Economists
This article deals with the issue of entry into an industry where firms share a collective reputation. First, we show that free entry is not socially optimal; there is a need for regulation through the imposition of a minimum quality standard. Second, we argue that a minimum quality standard can induce firms to enter the market. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a minimum quality standard should not always be considered as a barrier to entry.
Keywords: Institutional; and; Behavioral; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:eaae08:44465
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