Bilateralism in Agriculture when Countries use Distorting Domestic Policies

Daniel E. May

No 114657, 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland from European Association of Agricultural Economists

Abstract: A recent theoretical research proved that countries always have an incentive to deviate from global free trade when international markets are oligopolistic and when governments are politically biased. This result suggests that global free trade in agriculture (GFTA) cannot be reached as political bias and market power have both been identified. According to May (2011), bilateral agreements could eventually be used as alternative political tools to reach GFTA. This article extends the work of this author to determine whether bilateralism could also lead to GFTA in a realistic world where governments use distorting domestic policies to protect their agricultural sector.

Keywords: International; Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13
Date: 2011-09-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:eaae11:114657

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.114657

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