Ordering effects and strategic response in discrete choice experiments
Gabriela Scheufele and
Jeffrey Bennett
No 107743, Research Reports from Australian National University, Environmental Economics Research Hub
Abstract:
This study explores ordering effects and response strategies in repeated binary discrete choice experiments (DCE). Mechanism design theory and empirical evidence suggest that repeated choice tasks per respondent introduce strategic behavior. We find evidence that the order in which choice sets are presented to respondents may provide strategic opportunities that affect choice decisions (‘strategic response’). The findings propose that the ‘strategic response’ does not follow strong cost-minimization but other strategies such as weak cost-minimization or good deal/ bad deal heuristics. Evidence further suggests that participants, as they answer more choice questions, not only make more accurate choices (‘institutional learning’) but may also become increasingly aware of and learn to take advantage of the order in which choice sets are presented to them (‘strategic learning’).
Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29
Date: 2010-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-env, nep-evo and nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/107743/files/EERH_RR93.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Ordering effects and strategic response in discrete choice experiments (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:eerhrr:107743
DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.107743
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