Strategic Network Interdiction

Sunghoon Hong

No 108252, Climate Change and Sustainable Development from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow specifying a plan for carrying bads through a network from a base to a target. Simultaneously, an agency chooses a blockage specifying a plan for blocking the transport of bads through arcs in the network. The bads carried to the target cause a target loss while the blocked arcs cause a network loss. The adversary earns and the agency loses from both target loss and network loss. The adversary incurs the expense of carrying bads. In this model we study Nash equilibria and find a power law relation between the probability and the extent of the target loss. Our model contributes to the literature of game theory by introducing non-cooperative behavior into a Kalai-Zemel (cooperative) game of flow. Our research also advances models and results on network interdiction.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26
Date: 2011-06
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/108252/files/NDL2011-043.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemcl:108252

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.108252

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Climate Change and Sustainable Development from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().