Size Monotonicity and Stability of the Core in Hedonic Games
Dinko Dimitrov () and
Shao Chin Sung
No 115722, Climate Change and Sustainable Development from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable set in such games.
Keywords: Research; Methods/; Statistical; Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Size Monotonicity and Stability of the Core in Hedonic Games (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemcl:115722
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