The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution with Simultaneous Payoff Demands

Ricardo Nieva

No 206838, Climate Change and Sustainable Development from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can form if an only if payoff demands are feasible as in the Nash (1953) demand game. After smoothing the game (as in Van Damme (1991)), when the noise vanishes, when the discount factor is close to 1, and as in Okada´s (2011), the coalitional Nash bargaining solution is the unique stationary subgameperfect equilibrium.

Keywords: Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Risk and Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22
Date: 2015-07-16
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution with Simultaneous Payoff Demands (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemcl:206838

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.206838

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