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Applications of Relations and Graphs to Coalition Formation

Rudolf Berghammer, Agnieszka Rusinowska and Harrie de Swart

No 12162, Coalition Theory Network Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: A stable government is by definition not dominated by any other government. However, it may happen that all governments are dominated. In graph-theoretic terms this means that the dominance graph does not possess a source. In this paper we are able to deal with this case by a clever combination of notions from different fields, such as relational algebra, graph theory, social choice and bargaining theory, and by using the computer support system RelView for computing solutions and visualizing the results. Using relational algorithms, in such a case we break all cycles in each initial strongly connected component by removing the vertices in an appropriate minimum feedback vertex set. So, we can choose an un-dominated government. To achieve unique solutions, we additionally apply social choice rules. The main parts of our procedure can be executed using the RelView tool. Its sophisticated implementation of relations allows to deal with graph sizes that are sufficient for practical applications of coalition formation.

Keywords: Political; Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemct:12162

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.12162

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