EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

United We Vote

Jon Eguia ()

No 12172, Coalition Theory Network Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents obtains by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and cast them all together. We identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for an agent to benefit from the formation of the voting bloc, both if the agent is a member of the bloc and if the agent is not part of the bloc. We also determine whether individual agents prefer to participate in or step out of the bloc, and we find the different optimal internal voting rules that aggregate preferences within the coalition.

Keywords: Political; Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12172/files/wp060009.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: United We Vote (2007) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemct:12172

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.12172

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Coalition Theory Network Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().

 
Page updated 2020-02-19
Handle: RePEc:ags:feemct:12172