Non-Uniqueness of Equilibria in One-Shot Games of Strategic Communication

Irene Valsecchi

No 50404, Sustainable Development Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: The paper shows that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique in the strategic communication game of Crawford and Sobel (1982). First, different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality, despite fixed prior beliefs. Hence, there can be different equilibrium action profiles with the same size. Second, provided a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists, different message rules and beliefs can hold in other equilibria inducing the same action profile.

Keywords: Research; Methods/Statistical; Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15
Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/50404/files/19-09.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemdp:50404

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.50404

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Sustainable Development Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().