The Deep-Pocket Effect of Internal Capital Markets

Xavier Boutin, Giacinta Cestone, Chiara Fumagalli, Giovanni Pica and Nicolas Serrano-Velarde

No 55829, Institutions and Markets Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: This paper provides evidence that incumbents' access to group deep pockets has a negative impact on entry in product markets. Relying on a unique French data set on business groups, the paper presents three major findings. First, consistent with theoretical predictions, the amount of financial resources owned by incumbent-affiliated groups has a negative impact on entry in a market. This suggests that internal capital markets operate within corporate groups and that they have a potential anti-competitive effect. Second, the impact on entry of group financial strength is more important in markets where access to external funding is likely to be more difficult. Third, the more active are internal capital markets, the more pronounced the effect on entry of group deep pockets.

Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41
Date: 2009-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/55829/files/108-09.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The deep-pocket effect of internal capital markets (2013)
Working Paper: The Deep-Pocket Effect of Internal Capital Markets (2012)
Working Paper: The Deep-Pocket Effect of Internal Capital Markets (2012)
Working Paper: The Deep-Pocket Effect of Internal Capital Markets (2012)
Working Paper: The Deep-Pocket Effect of Internal Capital Markets (2011)
Working Paper: The Deep Pocket Effect of Internal Capital Markets (2009)
Working Paper: The Deep-Pocket Effect of Internal Capital Markets (2009)
Working Paper: The Deep-Pocket Effect of Internal Capital Markets (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemim:55829

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.55829

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