Decentralising environmental public spending: from political platforms to actual policies in the EU countries

Federica Lanterna, Giovanni Marin and Agnese Sacchi

No 391387, FEEM Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: Environmental challenges increasingly shape political discourses across Europe, yet their influence on actual environmental governance remains unclear. This paper examines the political economy mechanisms linking environmental change, party platforms, and the decentralisation of environmental protection expenditure in 27 EU member states from 2002 to 2022. We distinguish between political signalling – the commitments parties make in electoral manifestos – and policy implementation, measured through actual decentralised environmental spending. Our results reveal a sharp asymmetry: while extreme events substantially increase the salience of environmental protection in party platforms, they do not translate into changes in the territorial allocation of environmental expenditure. Instead, decentralisation responds primarily to long-term structural conditions, such as the relative weight of locally versus globally relevant emissions. Political orientations of governing coalitions, whether on environmental issues or decentralisation, show no systematic association with spending outcomes. Taken together, these findings highlight a persistent gap between electoral incentives and policy implementation in multilevel environmental governance, consistent with public-choice theories emphasising institutional inertia and limited political responsiveness beyond the stage of platform competition.

Keywords: Climate Change; Environmental Economics and Policy; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41
Date: 2026-02-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemwp:391387

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.391387

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