Counterproductive Counternarcotic Strategies?

Camilla I.M. Andersson

No 118959, GlobalFood Discussion Papers from Georg-August-Universitaet Goettingen, GlobalFood, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development

Abstract: We model the economic incentives surrounding opium crop production in Afghanistan. Specifically, we examine the impact of eradication policies when opium is used as a means of obtaining credit, and when the crops are produced in sharecropping arrangements. The analysis suggests that when perfect credit markets are available, an increased risk of eradication will lead to less land being allocated to opium poppy. However, when opium is used as a means of obtaining credit, the effects of eradication are no longer clear-cut. Finally, under sharecropping arrangements, increased risk of eradication will make the tenants worse off, while landlords may benefit.

Keywords: Crop Production/Industries; Risk and Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41
Date: 2011-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:gagfdp:118959

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.118959

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