QUANTIFYING THE BENEFITS OF CONSERVATION AUCTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM AN ECONOMIC EXPERIMENT

Uwe Latacz-Lohmann and Steven Schilizzi

No 7616, 47th Annual Conference, Weihenstephan, Germany, September 26-28, 2007 from German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA)

Abstract: Building on available theory, this work uses controlled laboratory experiments to investigate the budgetary and the economic performance of competitive tenders for allocating conservation contracts to landholders. Experiments have been replicated in two different countries to check for robustness of results. We find that auctions outperform the more traditional fixed-price schemes only in the one-shot setting. With repetition, the auctions quickly lose their edge. Our results suggest that previous estimates of conservation auction performance are too optimistic.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:gewi07:7616

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.7616

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