SUBSIDIES! THE OTHER INCENTIVE-BASED INSTRUMENT: THE CASE OF THE CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM

Hongli Feng, Catherine L. Kling, Lyubov Kurkalova and Silvia Secchi

No 18589, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Archive from Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Abstract: In this paper, we examine command-and-control (CAC) policies and market-based instruments (MBI) in the context of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). The CRP, an MBI in the form of subsidies, is by far the largest agro-environmental policy implemented to date. We compare the environmental performance of the CRP as implemented to a few counterfactual CAC polices using EPIC (Environmental Policy Integrated Climate), a bio-physical simulation model. In the context of multiple environmental indicators, no policy alternative emerges as a clear winner. The importance of the choice and design of CAC policies is emphasized.

Keywords: Land; Economics/Use (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29
Date: 2003
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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/18589/files/wp030345.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Subsidies! The Other Incentive‐Based Instrument: The Case of the Conservation Reserve Program (2006)
Working Paper: Subsidies! The Other Incentive-Based Instrument: The Case of the Conservation Reserve Program (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:hebarc:18589

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.18589

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