Policy Persistence in Environmental Regulation

Jinhua Zhao and Catherine L. Kling

No 18629, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Archive from Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Abstract: We study the optimal emission standards under uncertain pollution damages and transaction costs associated with policy changes. We show that in many situations, the authority should avoid or reduce the scale of a policy change in the presence of future transaction costs. Then policy persistence is a rational response of forward-looking policy makers to future transaction costs, rather than a passive outcome of the current political process.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:hebarc:18629

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.18629

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