A Non-Cournot Model of Voluntary Collective Action

Joel M. Guttman

No 232605, Working Papers from Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for Agricultural Economic Research

Abstract: The interaction of selfish, rational actors in the provision of a public good is analyzed, in an attempt to explain recent experimental findings as well as real-world cases of voluntary collective action. The model, which allows for more sophisticated behavior than that assumed by the conventional Cournot theory, predicts a higher level of collective action that that theory. The impacts of income effects and of the price elasticity of demand for the public good are given special emphasis.

Keywords: Agricultural; and; Food; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33
Date: 1982-08
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:huaewp:232605

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.232605

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