Old Age Security and Intergenerational Transfer of Family Farms

Claudio Pesquin, Ayal Kimhi and Yoav Kislev

No 232689, Working Papers from Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for Agricultural Economic Research

Abstract: Old farmers often stay with their children on the farm and share its income while the succeeding family receives the farm together with the obligation to care for the parents in their retirement. Using an intrafamily insurance framework for old age security and a bargaining game to formulate the intergenerational contract, we offer assessments of the value of farm transfer in a cooperative village in Israel, both to the granting parents and to the receiving young family.

Keywords: Farm; Management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Old Age Security and Inter-Generational Transfer of Family Farms (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:huaewp:232689

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.232689

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