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Contractual Arrangements of Traders in Chinese Wholesale Markets

Xiaohua Yu, David Abler () and Yinchu Zeng ()

No 51399, 2009 Conference, August 16-22, 2009, Beijing, China from International Association of Agricultural Economists

Abstract: Using a survey data of 700 traders, this study scrutinizes contract choices and enforcement for agricultural traders in China. This study finds that market service and environment are very important for both contract choices and enforcement. Better market service and environment can increase the propensity of using contract and the probability of contract enforcement both for purchase and sales of products. Education and memberships of special associations are also important for contract choices and enforcement. Higher education and affiliation to special associations for traders can increase the propensity of contracts and reduce contract breaches. However, the formats of contracts, whether contracts are oral or written, are not important for contract enforcement.

Keywords: Agribusiness; Industrial Organization; International Development; Marketing; Risk and Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18
Date: 2009-06-20
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:iaae09:51399

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.51399

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