CEO Compensation in Cooperatives versus Publicly Listed Firms

Feng Li and George W.J. Hendrikse

No 51619, 2009 Conference, August 16-22, 2009, Beijing, China from International Association of Agricultural Economists

Abstract: A multiple activities principal-agent model regarding CEO compensation in cooperatives is presented, capturing that cooperatives are not publicly listed and that they have to bring the enterprise to value as well as to serve member interests. A cooperative dominates a publicly listed firm in terms of efficiency when either activities are sufficiently complementary, or additional information is considered in the performance measure.

Keywords: Agribusiness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:iaae09:51619

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.51619

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