Sustainability of Regional Food Reserves When Default is Possible

Randall Romero-Aguilar, Mario Miranda () and Joseph W. Glauber

No 211825, 2015 Conference, August 9-14, 2015, Milan, Italy from International Association of Agricultural Economists

Abstract: We model a regional grain reserve as a game of two countries that agree to pool together a fraction of their grain to cope with production risk, but that can also repudiate their obligations at any moment. The reserve can be operated as a “credit union” or an “insurance union”. We find that although risk sharing is more effective when production shocks are negatively correlated, the regional reserve is more sustainable when the correlation is positive. We also find that an “insurance” game can be more sustainable than a “credit” game.

Keywords: Agricultural Finance; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/211825/files/R ... %20is%20Possible.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:iaae15:211825

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.211825

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2015 Conference, August 9-14, 2015, Milan, Italy from International Association of Agricultural Economists Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().